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ENEMIES WITHIN: Redefining the insider threat in 
organizational security policy1 
 
David S. Wall, Criminology, SASS, Durham University, 32 Old Elvet, Durham, 
DH1 3HN, UK. d.s.wall@durham.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
The critical importance of electronic information exchanges in the daily operation 
of most large modern organizations is causing them to broaden their security 
provision to include the custodians of exchanged data – the insiders. The 
prevailing data loss threat model mainly focuses upon the criminal outsider and 
mainly regards the insider threat as ‘outsiders by proxy’, thus shaping the 
relationship between the worker and workplace in information security policy. 
Policy, that increasingly takes the form of social policy for the information age as 
it acquires the power to include and exclude sections of society and potentially 
to re-stratify it? This article draws upon empirical sources to critically explore the 
insider threat in organizations. It looks at the prevailing threat model before 
deconstructing ‘the insider’ into various risk profiles, including the well-meaning 
insider, before drawing conclusions about what the building blocks of information 
security policy around the insider might be. 
 
Keywords: Information Security, Security Policy, Cybercrime, Organizations, 
Insider Threat 
 
Introduction 
As nearly all types of private and public sector organizations have turned to 
electronic rather than physical informational exchanges in order to improve their 
efficiencies and service delivery, their security mission has broadened from 
keeping unwanted intruders out of the organization to also responding to the 
problem of the insider threat. Today, the critical importance of electronic 
information exchanges in the operation of almost any organization now means 
that the security lens has to focus equally upon the custodians of exchanged 
data, those inside the organization as it does upon those outside it. To illustrate 
this point, forty three percent of the 607 respondents to the 2011 Cyber Security 
Watch Survey (CSWS) (CERT, 2011)
2 
reported that they had experienced an 
insider incident in the previous year. Most of the CSWS respondents found 
‘insider incidents’ to be more damaging than outsider attacks (CERT, 2011). 
 
1 
This research originated as a white paper prepared for Symantec on the well-meaning 
insider (Wall, 2011). 
2 
Carried out by USCERT (US Computer Emergency Response Team), USSS (US 
Secret Service), Deloite and CSO (Chief Security Officer) Magazine. 
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These trends are replicated in surveys from previous years, by other researchers 
(see CSI/FBI Surveys 2001-2006)
3 
and in a range of different jurisdictions using 
different methodologies. Hong, et al. (2010: 31), for example, argue that 90 per 
cent of attacks against organisations are insider attacks. Such concerns are 
heightened by the increasing practice of ethical and unethical 
‘whistle blowing’, as illustrated by Wikileaks and other cases (see later). These 
concerns also raise questions about the nature of the ‘attacks’ and whether or 
not a deeper understanding of them will contribute to our criminological 
knowledge about insiders and outsiders? Furthermore, how will such 
understanding also inform information security policy which is increasingly 
becoming a social policy for the information age as it acquires the power to 
include and exclude sections of society and potentially to stratify it? 
 
Bishop has broadly defined the insider threat as “… a trusted entity that is given 
the power to violate one or more rules in a given security policy ... the insider 
threat occurs when a trusted entity abuses that power" (Bishop, 2008: 1). The 
problem with such broad definitions is that they rarely capture the full dynamics 
of the problem and one of the major shortcomings of the overall security 
response to the insider threat is that it has become framed by the politics of 
organisational security and governance. The insider threat problem becomes 
‘externalised’ and the insiders who threaten information security are instinctively 
regarded as outsiders by proxy or redefined as ‘criminal others’ (Garland, 2001). 
Not only is this assumption misguided, but this perceived threat of ‘the enemy 
within’ engenders distrust within the organisation; distrust that is often 
(consciously or unconsciously) used as a tool of ‘governance’ (see Simon, 2007 
and Garland, 2001). Ironically, this paradox becomes intensified when the 
construction of the enemy within subsequently becomes a ‘site of 
entrepreneurship’; a resource that can be used by managers to garner additional 
resources and increase their power base
4
. As a consequence, the general mis- 
conceptualisation of the ‘insider’ tends to reduce the insider threat to a technical 
problem
5
. Once configured as a technical problem, then only technical solutions, 
such as access control software and other ‘threat mitigation techniques’ (Probst, 
et al. 2010), are perceived as resolutions. In short, the prevailing security 
paradigm frames perceptions of the insider threat in absolute terms rather than 
as a relative threat that is the product of a range of dynamic and situationally 
determined processes; processes that can also contribute to resolving the 
problem. 
 
In pursuit of a more dynamic model for understanding the insider threat it will be 
argued in this article that the insider issue is far more complex than is often 
described in computing science, security and other academic literature. It will be 
 
 
3 
See Richardson (2003) and Gordon, et al. (2003; 2004; 2005; 2006). 
4 
Simon (2007), Garland (2001) and others were largely focused at a level of statehood, 
this article focuses upon the organisation, though some are very large and transglobal. 
5 
As is the case more generally with cyber-crime that involves information theft. 
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argued that it encompasses a range of different motivations, including some that 
are certainly malicious, but also others that are the knock-on effects of 
organisational cultures and even the organisations’ own policies. A more 
sophisticated and multi-disciplinary understanding of the insider threat is not 
only important for informing organisational information security policy and for 
creating rules for the application of software controls such as those mentioned 
above, but also for responding legally to related problems when they arise and 
for preventing them from reoccurring. This article draws upon the findings of a 
number of recent data loss surveys and other relevant information sources to 
develop an understanding of the nature of the insider threat to the organization. 
It will identify the salient discussion points and issues that assist organizations in 
formulating remediation strategies. The first part looks at the prevailing 
organisational data loss threat model and introduces the problem of the insider 
threat and disaggregates it from the outsider threat with which it has been 
linked. The second part deconstructs the insider threat in order to map out the 
respective risk profiles of non-malicious and well-meaning insiders. The third 
part discusses the various options for security policy, especially the challenges 
created by the new insider threat model. The fourth part then looks to the future 
and at data spillage, insecurity and the Stuxnet warning. The fifth part draws 
some conclusions about how the insider threat might be reduced by identifying 
some building blocks for information security policy. 
 
The prevailing ‘outsider’ data loss threat model and the insider threat 
The debates over organizational information security have long been dominated 
by the need to keep dangerous outsiders such as hackers, fraudsters and those 
involved in industrial espionage from damaging the organization. The debates 
have distinguished between the hack (by brute force or evasion of security), the 
social engineering of insiders and information holders, and access prevention 
through DDOS (distributed denial of service) attack. In recent years these 
debates have broadened to include malicious insiders after they entered the 
threat landscape; almost to obsess on which of the two groups (insider or 
outsider) represents the greater threat to the organization. Both groups are in 
fact comprised of those who operate outside the organization’s norms and goal 
structure and whose actions seek to prey upon the organization’s vulnerabilities 
in order to penetrate its computer systems, often as a means to defrauding it or 
stealing mission critical data. The ‘drama’ surrounding these enemies ‘without 
and within’ captures media and public attention and contribute to ‘the culture of 
fear’ about cybercrime, heightening public concerns about internet safety in the 
process (Wall, 2008/11). Malicious insiders and outsiders are, however, not the 
focus of discussion here because there already exists a considerable amount of 
literature about them – see, for example, the reports by Symantec (2008; 
2009a), Verizon (2010) and many other cyber-security companies. But also see 
the relevant chapters and references in books about cybercrime and criminals, 
for example, Jewkes and Yar (eds, 2010), McQuade (2006), Wall (2007), 
Williams (2006), Yar (2006). They are not discussed here because while 
malicious outsiders and malicious insiders pose ‘the’ major threat to 
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organizations, the attention paid to them in the security debates and security 
policy grossly underplays the threat constituted by the non-malicious insiders 
within the organization – which is the focus of this article. Furthermore, the 
tendency to orient information security policies primarily against the ‘bad guys’ 
(as they are so often referred to in security debates); the malicious insiders who 
abuse their access rights for personal gain, or the disgruntled insiders who 
wreak revenge by disrupting operations or humiliating the organization, ignores 
the complexity of the issue and can create adverse consequences. Not least, 
that some well intentioned employees unjustly feel as though they are being 
treated like criminals, with a resulting loss of staff morale and the erosion of trust 
in organizational management and even the possible migration of some valuable 
employees to competitors and elsewhere. In the bigger picture it also begins to 
change the relationship between the worker and their workplace. 
 
The nature of the insider threat 
Data losses incurred by insiders through damage or misappropriation are very 
costly to organizations. The cost of losses has increased over the past decade 
along with the overall number of incidents. Ponemon’s calculations of the costs 
of breaches to organizations graphically illustrate the high stakes involved and 
why organizations should be concerned. The average organizational loss from 
reported data breaches in the U.S. rose from $6.65 million in 2008 to $6.75 
million in 2009 and $7.2million in 2010, with the cost of each compromised 
customer record rising from $202 to $204 to $214 respectively (Ponemon, 
2010a: 3; 2011). After beginning to tail off in 2008 and 2009 the US average loss 
began to rise again slightly in 2010 to match the longer term trend. In the U.K. 
(the lowest losses)
6 
the trend-line was roughly similar rising from £60 to £64 to 
£72 from 2008 to 2010 inclusive. (Ponemon, 2010b: 3). Some cheer may be 
drawn from these relatively small changes when they are compared with the 
rises in previous years
7
, see Figure 1 which indicates a steep rise from 2005— 
2007 with a lesser rise thereafter. This tailing of the increase in data loss costs 
after 2007/8 indicates the possible impact of improvements in security policies 
and associated training, although, such improvements take place in the face of 
an increase in data loss threats (see Ponemon, 2011: 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
Compared with the US ($214/£134), Germany ($191/£119); France ($136/£85); 
Australia ($123/£77); UK ($114/£72) 
7 
2005=$138; 2006=$182; 2007=$197; 2008=$202; 2009=$204; 2010= $214 
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Figure 1: Annual changes in overall costs of data breaches per unit (US). 
 
 
(Source: based upon statistics in Ponemon, 2011; 2010a: 3; 2009a: 3) 
 
The percentage of losses specifically attributed to insider negligence was found 
to have declined slightly along with the overall number of insider caused 
breaches. This decrease could be attributed to improvements in security 
awareness training (Ponemon, 2010a: 28), however, both the 2009 U.K. and 
U.S. samples still illustrated the large extent to which negligent insiders 
contribute to data breaches and also how costly to organizations that loss can 
be, even if the negligent costs are less than malicious ones. In the U.S., 40 per 
cent of data breaches (Ponemon, 2010a: 16) and 46 per cent in the UK 
(Ponemon, 2010b: 36) were estimated to be due to insider negligence. The 
costs of losses are significant, but also significant is that they result from the 
actions of a number of different types of insider which each have different threat 
profiles. This point is brought out later in the analysis of research data on 
incidents. 
 
The Ponemon research makes a very important and useful distinction between 
malicious and non-malicious negligent insiders, but does not elaborate further 
upon the negligent insiders. The following CERT/USS studies help us to further 
deconstruct the threat profile of the non-malicious insiders. Randazzo et al., a 
research team comprised of members of the U.S. Secret Service National 
Threat Assessment Center and the CERT
® 
Coordination Centre, studied known 
insider incidents relating to the banking and finance sector during the fiscal 
years of 2003 and 2004 (Randazzo et al., 2005). Banking and finance were one 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of thirteen critical infrastructure sectors
8 
prioritised by the President’s Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Board in the 2003 The National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace (White House, 2003: 16). The study by Randazzo et al. came to a 
number of interesting and clear conclusions: most of the acts were committed 
whilst on the job with the incidents being detected by various methods and also 
by different people within the organization. Although financial gain was the 
primary motivation of most offenders and victim organizations suffered financial 
loss as a result of the incidents, the offenders were not found to share a 
common profile (Randazzo et al., 2005). In 2005, a second U.S. Secret Service/ 
CERT
® 
research team (Keeney et al., 2005) analysed the role played by insiders 
in 49 specific attacks of sabotage upon the critical infrastructure between 1996 
and 2002. The findings of this in-depth view of the insider threat largely reflected 
the many findings from the first study, but it also revealed some very interesting 
and important findings about the profile in terms of status, psychology and 
motivations of malicious insiders. As might be expected, the findings confirmed 
that a negative work-related event triggered most actions, however, perhaps the 
most striking finding of the second CERT/ USS study was that the majority of the 
incidents were technologically un-sophisticated (Keeney et al., 2005: 17). In over 
three fifths of the cases (61 per cent), the insiders used relatively simple 
methods of attack, for example, user commands, information exchanges, and 
exploitation of physical security vulnerabilities. The remaining two fifths (39 per 
cent) adopted relatively more sophisticated methods, such as employing scripts 
or programs, autonomous agents, toolkits, flooding techniques, probing, 
scanning and spoofing (Keeney et al., 2005: 17). The fact that the insiders 
perpetrating the attacks tended to have relatively low levels of IT skills and used 
relatively simple ’trade craft‘ to achieve their goals begins to dispel the prevailing 
myth that all attacks by malicious insiders are carried out by sophisticated 
operators. 
 
The 2011 CERT
® 
annual data on insider threats (a different series of data to the 
above) compares its most recent survey with previous years [2004-2010]. It 
shows a slight drop in the percentage of organizations that fall victim to insider 
incidents, from two thirds (66%) in 2007 to three fifths (58%) in the 2011 report 
(2% down on 2010). It is debateable whether or not the drop in the number of 
insider incidents is significant or not. On the one hand, it may reflect 
improvements in security policies and training (as also found in Ponemon 
2010b) as nearly one third of respondents (32%) said they monitored the online 
activities of disgruntled employees who had tendered their resignations or had 
been fired or laid off (CERT, 2010: 2). On the other hand, it could simply be a 
reflection of sample bias since the sample was self-selected. Alternatively, it 
could be a combination of the two. More conclusive is that when an attack 
 
 
8 
The complete list being: banking and finance; information and telecommunications; 
transportation; postal and shipping; emergency services; continuity of government; public 
health; food; energy; water; chemical industry and hazardous materials; agriculture; 
defence industrial base (Randazzo et al. (2005: 3). 
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involved an insider, then victim organizations were more significantly affected 
and the consequences of the attack were more damaging and costly (than with 
losses incurred by outsiders) (CERT, 2010: 1). Verizon’s 2010 Data Breach 
Investigations Report, which also drew upon US Secret Service data, also found 
a decrease in data breach incidents, but, in contrast to the CERT report, found 
an increase in insider attacks by those who maliciously abused their right to 
access corporate information (Verizon, 2010). 
 
It is hard, if not impossible, to perfectly match the statistics and findings of 
different breach reports because of their different methodologies and analytical 
frameworks. The CERT data, for example, is largely comprised of self-reported 
incidents and so is biased against those who do not report, where as the 
Verizon data is mainly composed of data from cases where the Verizon team 
was brought onsite by request of the victim to perform an investigation and will 
be biased towards the more serious case and victims’ perceptions of what 
constitutes victimisation. The Ponemon data, in contrast, was solicited from a 
structured sample designed to eliminate bias, but inevitably contains a small 
bias towards the respondents who chose to participate. Having said that, the 
Ponemon data brings to the table a very detailed view of the individuals 
involved. In contrast, the Open Security Foundation (OSF) data
9 
used later is 
obtained by its project curators and volunteers scouring news feeds, blogs, and 
other websites looking for data breaches, new and old. They search for incidents 
that are not yet in the database and update and verify incidents they have already 
logged. There is some bias here towards the larger and more public facing 
incidents, but it nevertheless adds an important independent source of 
quantitative and qualitative data. Finally, the LMRMC (LM Research & Marketing 
Consultancy) data drawn upon later canvassed responses from office workers 
over a two week period of time. As with some of the other studies there will be a 
bias here towards respondents who felt motivated enough to respond to the 
survey. Bring all these findings together, however, and it is nevertheless 
possible to identify some broad trends. Trends that can be expressed through an 
analysis of the OSF’s freely accessible database of reported data breaches. The 
OSF data also illustrates a gradual overall increase in insider breaches over the 
past five years against a decrease in breaches caused by outsiders from just 
under a quarter (23%) in 2005 to just under a half (47%) in 2010 (using data 
until November 2010). 
 
Table 1: Insider and Outsider Breaches 
 Insider Outside Unknown 
Pre-2005 34% 59% 7% 
2005 23% 74% 4% 
2006 32% 63% 4% 
2007 22% 75% 2% 
9 
See OSF site at:  http://datalossdb.org/about. 
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2008 31% 63% 6% 
2009 40% 52% 8% 
2010 47% 47% 6% 
Totals 33% 62% 6% 
 
[Data analysed from raw OSF data. Total n=3001 cases] 
 
What is certain from these reports and others, is that the number of insider- 
related data loss incidents across the public and private sectors has increased 
during the past 5 years and is likely to be related to the number of individuals 
with direct access to financial, strategic or personal information and also its 
exchangeable value. Other contributory factors also include an increase in 
detection of insider breaches as the result of sensitization to the problem by 
corporate security departments and other interested parties – through reports 
produced at that time, such as CERT (2005). The implication is that many 
insider breaches now detected may not have previously been detected. But, 
whilst there are broad similarities between the findings there are also some 
differences in the conceptualisation of what constitutes an insider attack and 
there also appears to be some disparity between attacks that are malicious, and 
those which are damaging to the organization, but are not driven by malicious 
intent. Further analysis of the insider cases summarised in Table 2 (which were 
shown as a total in Table 1), finds that although the overall percentage of insider 
driven breaches (and associated losses) has broadly increased over the years, 
as stated earlier, the percentage of non-malicious insider driven breaches 
increased inversely to the percentage of malicious breaches. 
 
Table 2: A breakdown of insider breaches 
Insider- Inside- Inside- All 
 
Pre- 
2005 
unknown 
 
4% 
Accidental 
 
19% 
Malicious 
 
11% 
Insiders 
 
34% 
2005 1% 16% 6% 23% 
2006 1% 25% 6% 32% 
2007 3% 15% 5% 22% 
2008 4% 18% 9% 31% 
2009 1% 30% 9% 40% 
2010 3% 31% 13% 47% 
Totals 2% 22% 8% 33% 
 
[Data analysed from raw OSF data. Total n=3001 cases] 
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In light of the hitherto unsophisticated treatment of the ‘insider’ threat, the lack of 
detail in distinctions between malicious and non-malicious insiders may explain 
the apparent lack of effectiveness of some existing security policies, but also 
some of the differences between the various findings. An explanation for this 
lack of sophistication can be found in the way that conventional threat profiles 
tend to simply reflect the adversarial nature of criminal justice processes in most 
Western societies, as reflected in the good guy/bad guy binary described earlier. 
It is an adversarial model that is historically based upon protecting the deserving 
members of society from the predations of the ‘dangerous classes’; the thugs, 
hooligans, footpads and pick-pockets etc., who robbed or humiliated innocent 
members of the public and made them fearful of walking the streets. Indeed, the 
police were formed in the early Nineteenth Century specifically to protect the 
public and maintain order by managing or prosecuting these dangerous others, 
who were not to be deemed part of mainstream society (see Reiner, 2000). This 
practice has echoes today in cyber-security because this search for the 
‘dangerous other’ immediately maps onto the hacker, or organized criminal in 
the case of financial crime, or the paedophile in cases involving images of child 
abuse
10
. Threat profiles are therefore reduced to ‘good guy’/ ‘bad guy’ binaries 
that reflect contemporary criminal stereotypes that subsequently define the 
relationships between security personnel and the rest of the organisation. 
 
Mapping out the risk profiles of non-malicious and well-meaning insiders 
The fly in the ointment here is that not all insider precipitated incidents are 
malicious, so they do not neatly fit into the perceived offender stereotype; for 
example, some insiders may be negligent as illustrated earlier, or may simply 
skip security measures to make life easier for themselves (or be more efficient). 
Yet, the dogged pursuit of the conventional offender stereotypes excites the 
media and shapes public opinion and leads to increased demands for security 
which cannot always be met. This is because the hunt for known demons 
invariably tends to miss those falling outside the stereotype, which is why it is so 
important to distinguish between the different types of insider who are clearly an 
important part of the security problem. The worst case security scenario here is 
that security policy becomes too draconian by demonizing insiders as well as 
outsiders, slowing down the enterprise without effectively protecting it. An 
equally worst case scenario is that the resulting security ends up a simply being 
‘presentational’, or what Schneier (2003) calls ‘security theater’ which is publicly 
visible security measures that are primarily designed to demonstrate to the 
public that security countermeasures to an identified problem have at least been 
considered, even though they have little actual influence upon security. In short, 
security policy could end up damaging the organization if it does not respond to 
the different types of insider. 
 
 
 
10 
Please note that there is no suggestion here that hackers’, fraudsters or paedophile 
actions are not in any way be dangerous, what is at question here is the uncritical 
acceptance that outsiders are the only threat. 
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In order to develop our understanding of the non-malicious insider it is useful to 
draw upon the findings of recent research into information technology practices 
and perceptions of online risk in the workplace. An international research study 
of 3,250 office workers conducted by LM Research & Marketing Consultancy 
(LMRMC) over a two week period in September 2010 across six countries 
(1000, UK; 500, Canada; 500, Hungary; 250, Poland; 500, South Africa; 500, 
USA) reveals some interesting similarities of practice and also of attitude 
(LMRMC, 2010). Whilst a half (48%) of the workers used remote work systems 
(30% secure and 18% non-secure systems), almost three quarters (71%) 
emailed work documents to their private email address to work on them outside 
the employer’s premises. Half (49%) copied work to encrypted or protected USB 
sticks and two fifths (42%) to non-encrypted or non-protected USB sticks which 
they took home to work on. Much of this information, just over half (54%) was 
unauthorised even though most organizations (90%) had policies regarding 
information use and access. 
 
Although there were some small fluctuations across countries, the above figures 
confirm that large amounts of data circulate outside work-based systems in a 
number of different formats. Furthermore, the findings also reveal that these 
people are prepared to take risks, especially when they think it appropriate. 
They also use network technologies fairly intensively, especially social 
networking to extend their professional, as well as social, contacts. But, the 
reasons given by respondents for removing data from the organization were not 
driven by malicious intent, rather they were quite pragmatic. A third (34%) 
wanted to use the information so that they could work from home, a further third 
(32%) wanted the information for an offsite meeting, and just over two fifths 
(22%) wanted to keep the information ‘in a safe place’. Just under a quarter 
(23%) did admit to taking information with them to a new job – though this 
practice is often deemed acceptable in the field of creative arts and designs 
where the creator has an intellectual property right in the information. A very 
small amount (6%) wanted to disclose it to a third party or make it publicly 
available (4%) – which might indicate some deviance. Similarly, a comparatively 
small percentages used social networking when they were not supposed to do 
so and less that two fifths (18%) worked in organizations that actively blocked 
social networking (LMRMC, 2010). 
 
At this point the LMRMC findings can be used to argue that these workers 
present to the organization a considerable amount of risk, however, a more 
considered reading of the findings reveals that the respondents/ workers were 
aware of not only the risks, but also the capacities of the technology. Three fifths 
(60%) said that they were more cautious about their online behaviour at work 
than they were at home, with a further sixth (17%) saying that they were 
cautious at both home and at work. The ‘cautious’ group were equally 
concerned about infecting work computers, inadvertently accessing offensive 
content, or that they might face disciplinary action. Rather worryingly, the 
remaining quarter or so (23%) said that they were less cautious at work when 
11  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
online than they were at home. However, just because they said they were less 
cautious does not mean that they were being reckless, it is just that they felt that 
their work computer had better security than they did at home, or they had an IT 
department who would sort out any problems. To reaffirm the emerging theme of 
responsibility, the overall level of caution found earlier was also reflected in the 
very low percentages (2%) of respondents who admitted to losing information that 
they had taken home without permission. Only a small percentage (6%) had 
lost devices in the past year that contained information (1% laptop
11
, 1% PDA, 
3% Cellphone, 3% USB stick). 
 
The findings of the 2010 LMRMC research appear to contradict the larger losses 
found in the CERT and Verizon studies described earlier, however, a simple 
explanation for this disparity might be that both studies had very different 
respondent groups. As suggested earlier, the LMRMC data may be a skewed 
sample because it comprises of people who chose to respond to the 
questionnaire and who were disproportionately committed to their occupation 
and to their organization – thus omitting an as yet unexplained group, the other 
types of non-malicious insiders - the type of individuals who would probably not 
be motivated enough to respond to an online survey. Despite these ‘unknown 
unknowns’, however, the LMRMC data is important because it begins to explain 
some of the unknowns in the CERT data, namely the profile of the non-malicious 
insider. 
 
In sum, the various research findings discussed earlier all broadly suggest the 
presence of two main groups of non-malicious insider: the negligent insider and 
‘the well-meaning insider’ which are distinguished by different motives. Negligent 
insiders primarily pursue their own goals, whereas well-meaning insiders are 
more likely to pursue those of the organization. Since an organizational security 
chain is only as good as its weakest link, and the risk potential of both groups is 
missing from discussions about organizational internet security, then we need to 
know more about them. 
 
The negligent insider 
The negligent insiders are those employees, associates or affiliates who have 
legitimate access to an IT system and, for want of a better description, are those 
individuals whose eyes are not always on the ball and who might cut corners to 
make life easy for themselves. During the course of their work they will accept 
the broader organizational goals, but only accept the policies designed to 
achieve them as far as they do not encumber them with much more additional 
work, or can be used to lighten their load. For the most part they will embrace 
 
 
 
11 
This figure contrasts with the Ponemon (2008) study which found that 35 percent of 
companies said that the main single loss of data was through lost laptops. The difference 
may be methodological, e.g., the LMRMC (2010) study is of individual employees, 
whereas Ponemon’s respondents are companies. 
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organizational policy minimally and also in terms of their own interpretation of its 
spirit. 
 
The well-meaning insider 
Ever present, but rarely acknowledged in internet data breach research and 
organizational security debates, the ‘well-meaning insider’ is the proverbial 
elephant in the room. The ‘well-meaning insider’ is typically the valued employee 
who, unlike the other security threats (including the negligent insider), is 
dedicated to pursuing performance goals set for them by their organization. It is 
in the pursuit of such goals that they may regard security policies as less 
important, which can sometimes, inadvertently, cause them to become a threat 
to their organization. Data spilt by well meaning insiders, for example, may 
swiftly become the target of hackers (the greater threat) who then use that data 
against the organization. Their ‘actions can act as a prequel event to 
subsequent attacks by more malicious parties’ and ‘they help proliferate the 
spread of confidential data, which makes it easier for malicious insiders to get a 
hold of it’ (Kevin Rowney, quoted in Shiels, 2009). It is a problem that will only 
get worse, say, as more and more individuals are laid off because of the 2010+ 
public spending cuts in Western countries and the well-meaning insiders will 
unintentionally assist more vengeful colleagues (Shiels, 2009). 
 
The process of demarcating these risk categories is further complicated by the 
presence of ‘outsider insiders’ or affiliates who are linked to the organization but 
are not formally part of it, for example, where a function has been outsourced. 
Also, by the ‘Insider outsiders’, those who work within the organizational 
boundaries, but who may be interns, or be either seconded into the organization 
from elsewhere or seconded out. These ‘hybrid’ insiders are acknowledged here 
as a group that require further study. 
 
The introduction of the distinction between ‘well-meaning’ and ‘negligent’ 
insiders into security debates blurs the (now) conventional ‘criminal outsiders 
and insiders’ stereotype and challenges conventional wisdoms relating to the 
data loss risk model, especially when the threat that they constitute may be 
directly linked to bad practice within the organization or even the organization’s 
own occupational culture. With these different risk groups on the organizational 
threat landscape in mind, this article now explores the threat to data loss posed 
by the well-meaning and also negligent insiders. 
 
The implications of the new insider threat model for security policy The 
disproportionate attention and resource given to outsiders in security debates 
vastly understates the current response to the insider threat, and yet, as outlined 
earlier the financial implications may be considerable. Because of this we need to 
map out what we understand by the ‘insider threat’ in much greater detail, 
especially as not all non-malicious insiders pose the same level of threat 
to the organization. We therefore have to discern between them and break this 
group down further. 
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The distinction between malicious and non-malicious insiders has two 
implications. Firstly, we need to know more about the insider profile in order to 
fashion a policy response. Secondly, rather than taking a ‘wall-and-fortress’ 
approach to the problem, a more risk-based approach is needed that, as 
DeZabala (Cited in EON, 2010) has recommended, focuses ‘on what assets are 
at risk of leaving the organization through the IT environment as well as the 
threats entering the organization through the same means’. We have already 
discerned between ‘negligent’ and ‘well-meaning’ insiders in terms of motivation, 
but motivation cannot always be identified at the point of impact, so it is 
assumed that the two groups would act differently in each of the following 
categories, but likely with the same impact. The former group would negligently 
ignore or misapply rules, where as the latter could achieve the same effect by 
their eagerness to (as they see it) contribute to organizational goals. These 
distinctions should be useful in assisting the framing of questions in future 
surveys about insiders. Below is a general typology of different types of non- 
malicious insider in terms of the ways they can lose or spill data. The first 
typology is of four risk groups of employees within the organization who can 
cause data spillage, most of which can be either negligent or well-meaning in 
terms of motivation. The second typology outlines the various ways that data 
can spill. 
 
Non-malicious risk groups 
The underminers are the insiders who routinely undermine computer security 
systems in order to improve their own access to information. They take the path 
of least resistance and ignore the spirit of security to make their working lives 
easier. These insiders use very simple passwords, or may use one password for 
all of the secure sites they access. Alternatively, these insiders might write down 
passwords on post-it notes attached to computer screens so as not to forget 
them, or they might circulate them to close colleagues to check emails whilst 
away on holiday. Passwords have even been known to be circulated amongst 
friends via social networking sites to allow them to check their emails whilst on 
holiday. Like the data spills problem mentioned below, these personal practices 
fall under the provenance of IT management, but they may also result from too 
strong, rather than weak, IT management practices. They illustrate the security 
paradox whereby the more technically secure a system becomes, the weaker it 
becomes in practice because impatient humans who (tend to) have finite memory 
retention for passwords have to use it regularly. 
 
The over-ambitious understand the importance of security but knowingly take 
risks to purposefully bypass bureaucratic security processes in order to be more 
effective in achieving what they think are organizational goals and often to 
advance their careers. They may be encouraged by the organization’s own 
culture and work ethos, skipping cumbersome security to become more efficient. 
Such examples might include eschewing encryption because it is time consuming 
and complicated – the fact is that it can take a worker’s mind off the 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
job. Alternatively they may (mis)use their access privileges to drive business in a 
dangerous way, as has been the past experience of the banking sector. 
 
The socially engineered are those employees, usually in low paid positions at the 
public facing end of the organization, who may be duped by malicious outsiders 
into sharing sensitive information or even giving access to systems. They are 
prone to fall victim to social engineering tactics employed (usually) by outsiders. 
These insiders can be deceived into giving out key information about an 
organization, or into giving out proprietary information or access codes that give 
outsiders access to its systems. Alternatively, they might give access codes or 
key information to others because they genuinely feel that they are being helpful 
and are acting in good faith. In such situations, the insiders may feel that they are 
being helpful in responding to a genuine request and may not employ routine due 
diligence as practice. They may also feel as though they are acting 
in the organizations interests and /or according to company policy – the 
customer comes first! 
 
The data-leakers are the growing cadre of ‘whistleblowers’ who, for various 
ethical or unethical reasons, leak data to the public via social network 
technology, such as Wikileaks, information they feel that the public should be 
informed about. Although they act against the organizational interests and often 
illegally (depending upon jurisdiction) they cannot simply be termed malicious in 
their actions if there is a public interest in the leak. As the wiki-leaks become 
more and more frequent and the technology that facilitates the leaks becomes 
more understood by the public, then it is likely that more and more secure 
information will be leaked, either for malicious or well-meaning reasons. The 
history of viral information flows across social networks would also suggest that 
the negative impacts of such leaks upon organizational reputations can be 
considerable (BBC, 2007). 
 
Methods of non-malicious data spillage 
The non-malicious data spillers are the employees of an organization who have 
legitimate access to information or databases, but are prone to spill data 
because of (sometimes routine) organizational practices not checked by lax IT 
policies. Data spillers may: 
 
Accidentally disclose their key data and strategic information by losing unsecured 
computers or by losing memory sticks or other data storage devices whether 
encrypted or unencrypted. Such losses create a large amount of media 
coverage, public sensitivity and the emotional public responses to the losses by 
(especially public) organizations. See for example the public outcry and scandal 
following the 2007 loss of two CD-ROM data discs by staff at the UK HM 
Revenue and Customs which contained the details of 25 million Child Benefit 
claimants (BBC, 2007). The fact is, that relatively little direct financial loss 
appears to result from stolen laptops (according to the earlier findings), yet their 
loss is highly media sensitive enough to damage organizational reputations. See 
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for example, the loss of laptops containing, information about military recruits 
(Mail, 2008); pension data (BBC, 2008); personal bank information (Raywood, 
2009); details of dairy farmers (Raywood, 2010). Also, while these were largely 
accidental and some prevention practices can be adopted, they are quite rare 
occurrences when they are placed against the backdrop of the billions of data 
exchanges that regularly take place within and between organizations. 
Unfortunately, it is only after data loss accidents occur that the full 
consequences, financial, reputational or otherwise, can be realised. 
 
De-secure data for user convenience. For the user’s convenience, data may be 
routinely copied from its secure location and then transferred to unsecured office 
or home computers (either portable or fixed) that are publicly shared and with no 
access control or other security. 
 
Leave data on the hard-drives of discarded machines. Following upgrades, 
many organisational computers are discarded and then scrapped or sold on 
without their contents being secured and removed. In their 2009 research, for 
example, Kessler found that 40 per cent of second hard drives bought through 
an auction site still contained data ranging from corporate spreadsheets to e- 
mails and personal photos (Mearian, 2009). 
 
Inadequately manage data that is shared with third parties. Weak third-party 
data governance policies can allow ‘outsider insiders’ or ‘insider outsiders’ 
(secondees and interns) mentioned earlier to lose data it or abuse it, typically, 
from the lack of use of encryption. 
 
Send unsecured data through public postal and delivery services. Sending data 
via public delivery systems such as the postal service can lead to data being lost 
or falling to the wrong hands causing reputational, if not real damage, as 
happened in the major U.K. data spill events (Raywood, 2009; 2010). 
 
Not update email and information distribution lists. Automated data creation 
processes set up a long time ago and not updated will continue to send out key 
data, which becomes especially problematic if the data’s meaning and 
importance has changed in the years since a data collection process was 
initiated. 
 
Not review user access rights. Administrators can often fail to remove access 
rights to those who are no longer part of the organization, or not deleting leavers 
from email circulation lists. When either happens, data continues to flow to 
individuals who may have moved elsewhere in the organization or many have 
even left it. Most of these data spills result from routine practices that have been 
allowed to continue because of weak IT management practices and an under- 
prioritisation of security. 
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Data spillage, insecurity and the Stuxnet warning 
Many enterprises do not have data loss prevention systems or tools that identify 
data spillage (Symantec, 2009b), but the recent Stuxnet malware (malicious 
software) brought with it a serious warning about the importance of preventing 
spillage from and also into computers. Analysis of Stuxnet’s structure and its 
pathways through computer systems shows that organizational insiders are 
likely to have provided information crucial to its creation, installation and 
propagation through various systems. A more detailed analysis of Stuxnet can 
be found in the research by Falliere et al. (2010), but in short, it is a form of 
malicious software that can be used to sabotage SCADA (Supervisory Control 
And Data Acquisition) based industrial control systems ranging from water 
utilities to gas pipelines to power stations, including some nuclear power plants. 
Stuxnet represents a ‘paradigm shift’ in malware threats because of the way that 
it enters sometimes closed operating systems via insiders through infected USB 
sticks; it propagates itself by establishing a rootkit as well as backdoor 
connections that can allow external control; and also attacks only specific types 
of SCADA systems produced by specific manufacturers. Although a range of 
antecedents exist, the most recent iteration of Stuxnet, discovered in mid-2010, 
was found to have infected approximately 100,000 systems worldwide, although 
the evidence is mixed as to whether or not it has found its specific target and as 
to what impact it had (BBC, 2011). 
 
Where Stuxnet contrasts with the design and function of preceding threats is 
that it is a ‘large, complex piece of malware with many different components and 
functionalities’ and constitutes a particularly complex threat (Falliere et al., 
2010). Falliere et al. (2010) estimate that Stuxnet took many months to create 
and was the work of a fairly large and highly skilled team. Important is the fact 
that the malware needed to be directly introduced into the target environment by 
an insider because the most sensitive SCADA systems are usually kept 
unconnected to the internet. Falliere et al. (2010) argue that removable drives, 
typically USB sticks were the most likely means by which the malware was 
introduced into the system: it ‘... may have occurred by infecting a willing or 
unknowing third party, such as a contractor who perhaps had access to the 
facility, or an insider’ (2010). More significant is the observation that the 
designers of Stuxnet will have needed to possess very detailed knowledge 
about the design of the SCADA particular systems to be attacked. This 
information could only be obtained with the assistance of an insider, very likely 
the result of careless practice by a well-meaning insider which led to a data spill 
that was capitalized by a hacker. 
 
Although Stuxnet is not unique in requiring insider complicity, see, for example, 
the Hydraq Trojan (Symantec, 2010). It has, however, raised the risk stakes and 
has highlighted the insider threat issue. The discovery of custom-built variants 
will likely continue this practice (Zetter, 2010). The Stuxnet example also 
suggests that being forewarned about the nature of the different types of insider 
threats is to be forearmed and that some of the events that lead to insiders 
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spilling data could be reduced. Greater security, for example, around the 
schematic plans of all systems, also tighter security policy about the use of 
removable drives could make life much harder for data spillers /propagators (the 
insiders with USB sticks). Finally, Stuxnet also illustrates the necessity to ensure 
that security measures are both effective and understood by all employees 
whilst being internalised into organizational structures. Measures that might, for 
example, combine technologically based security such as content aware 
systems to control identity and access with staff education about the issues and 
the law and even, perhaps, some financial incentive or disincentive related to 
compliance or non-compliance. Content aware control systems supplemented 
by some form of social or economic value system would be preferable to say, 
pure network analysis based systems such as computer traffic monitoring 
algorithms. Algorithms may be able to differentiate between the different internet 
traffic patterns of malicious outsiders and all insiders, but not necessarily 
between malicious and non-malicious insiders; a problem that is succinctly 
described by Caputo, et al., (2009: 2): 
 
“One of the real challenges in developing technology to help us tackle 
this cyber challenge is that malicious insiders usually do not need to 
engage in rule breaking behavior. They can use their legitimate access 
to gather and steal sensitive information. Their actions remain largely 
unseen using traditional cyber-detection methods such as log auditing 
and intrusion detection, which largely focus on detecting attempted or 
actual rule-breaking behavior”. 
 
Caputo, et al., (2009) actually argue that they have developed technology based 
methods to discern between malicious and non-malicious activity, but this 
remains at an early stage of development and does not as yet show signs that it 
could discern between the different types of non-malicious and well-meaning 
insider. Until the social science (e.g. conceptualizations of non-malicious 
insiders) matches the science (developing competent algorithms to interpret the 
conceptualizations) then the problem of false-positives will undermine the micro- 
politics of security. As, Vint Cerf, one of the fathers of the internet once 
observed, ‘[t]here are no electronic filters that separate truth from fiction’ (Cerf, 
2003: 10). 
 
Discussion and Conclusions: Reducing incidents of data loss 
The different categories of non- malicious insiders outlined earlier show that any 
strategies to reduce incidents of data loss (whether by well-meaning or negligent 
insiders) will have to be multi-faceted and combine a number of tactics. This is 
because the two most common characteristics found in each category of non- 
malicious insider threats are a combination of the failure of the individual insider 
to protect key data, but also the failure of organizational management to install 
and maintain workable procedures to ensure that insiders protect data. Even 
where there are competent data security policies in place there is a often a 
failure to account for changes over time, such as changes in the importance of 
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data or not removing those no longer part of the organization from email 
circulation lists. Such considerations are important because the main threat of 
the well-meaning insider is the release of data that can be misused by others, 
usually as a prequel event to a subsequent attack. So data loss and security 
strategies will, on the one hand, have to be designed to prevent poor employee 
work practices and attitudes which result in the six ways that data can be lost. 
But, on the other hand, they will also have to incorporate actions that will reduce 
the impact of any bad employer practices that may enable the poor employee 
work practices and attitudes that lead to data spillage. In reality there tends to be 
a fusion of risks which forms a toxic combination of the two, so remedies may be 
need to be reflexive, complex and situationally different, if not bespoke. 
 
The following considerations become the building blocks of policy. Firstly, there is 
the need to be pragmatic about the well-meaning (and negligent) insider by 
ensuring that security policy addresses the problem from an organizational 
perspective and does not simply demonize the well-meaning insider as a deviant 
or criminal ‘other’. Secondly, there is the need to avoid a blame culture and not 
immediately interpret the actions of non-malicious insiders as criminal. After all, 
the information given by a well-meaning insider who has inadvertently 
compromised a system may have been given in good faith. Indeed, these 
insiders are not (usually) criminals, far from it, they are often the product of the 
organization and, in the case of the well-meaning (rather than negligent) insider, 
are often trying to please the organization – they just see the goals in a slightly 
different way. It has to be accepted that this is a different kind of threat to 
malicious outsiders and insiders and security policies have to be framed 
accordingly. Each of the different outsider and insider groups need to be 
recognised and responded to by different strategies or sub-strategies. Well- 
meaning insiders usually have the organizations interests at heart and require 
further training, not discipline. Negligent insiders do not always understand the 
organizations interests and require training and incentivization, not discipline in 
the first instance. 
 
Thirdly, the underlying source of the potential data loss problem is not 
necessarily the individual workers themselves, but the way they react to, or 
interpret the organizational goals as they are expressed in company policy and 
organizational cultures. So, when addressing this problem – which is the 
organization’s problem - a greater understanding is required of how their 
employees view them, their mission and also the goals. They also need to be 
acutely aware of their own organizational culture - which is the unwritten part of 
organizational life that is comprised of the professional and personal 
experiences that employees communicate to one another through their work 
based interactions and which shapes the way that employees interpret 
organizational goals and management directives. Categorising these well- 
meaning insiders as deviants in the first instance will not resolve the problem 
and lessen the risk, and it will certainly not buy their compliance in clearing up 
the aftermath. Simply put, the work ethic that firms value most, a 100+ per cent 
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commitment, can become a weak point. By encouraging hard work ethics and 
personal commitment to the job by providing laptops etc., plus off-site access to 
systems so that they can work at home, etc., employers improve their 
productivity. But this practice can also create weaknesses as well as benefits at 
the risk of data loss increases. Not least, the weakness of the human condition 
when workers are working too hard or are off their guards etc. This is not a 
question of ceasing such activities, else most organizations would collapse, but 
what it does say is that both employers and employees have to be aware of the 
potential weaknesses. It also impresses upon those drafting security policy the 
need to achieve an acceptable balance in the work-life relationship. 
 
In conclusion, this article has sought to redefine and re-theorise the insider threat 
in organisational security and has provided some general principles that should 
be considered when framing security policy. Moreover, it has shown both the 
diversity of the insider threat, but also how its roots can lie within organisational 
policy and culture and not necessarily predatory outsiders. In so doing these 
finding begin to change our understanding of the nature of the relationship 
between modern workers, their organization and ultimately their relationship with 
the state itself. Information brokering, as outlined earlier, is becoming central to 
the core operations of most modern organizations so that, intentionally or 
unintentionally (because we currently do not know which) their security policy is 
increasingly acquiring the power to include, exclude and stratify sections of 
society. Because of this innate power, then the formulation of 
security policy has to be more holistic than it is currently regarded and it has to 
adopt a more relative rather than absolutist approach to the insider threat 
because of its variable nature. 
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